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Fetishizing Sovereignty in the Remain and Leave campaigns 
 
Abstract: 
 
In this article we approach Brexit via the conceptual framing of sovereignty in the political 
communication of the Remain and Leave campaigns. This angle, despite its general salience 
in public discourse, has been analytically underutilised.  We put forward a twofold argument: 
i) that national sovereignty has been fetishized in both campaigns, and that ii) this has 
important implications for the discursive construction of self and other within the neoliberal 
paradigm. By employing a Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism, as well as 
Sivanandan’s (2001) notion of xeno-racism, we theoretically and empirically identify the 
status of homo oeconomicus in order to analyse the fetishization of sovereignty according to 
precarity and ethno-racial terms. The framing of the nexus between sovereignty and 
immigration reveals that the other to homo oeconomicus is not to be found outside the 
neoliberal paradigm, but rather within it. The self and other homo oeconomicus are narrated 
as constantly competing with each other over scarce employment and welfare resources. The 
framing of both campaigns recognises and validates the anxieties of the British homo 
oeconomicus self and suggests that they should be anxious about the xeno homo oeconomicus  
not because of their respective differences but because of their sameness. 
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racism  
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I. Introduction 
On the 20th of February 2016 the then UK Prime Minister David Cameron set the 23rd 
of June of the same year as the date for the referendum on the UK’s membership to the 
European Union (henceforth EU). The British electorate was asked to cast their ballot 
considering the following question: “Should the United Kingdom remain a member of the 
European Union?” The two available answers for the above question were: “Remain a 
member of the European Union” or “Leave the European Union”. The UK voted to leave the 
EU by 52% to 48%. Whilst the true scope and significance of this decision is yet to be seen in 
the decades to come, the referendum and the political campaigns leading to it have facilitated 
the fetishization of sovereignty due to  the following reasons. 
 Firstly, the general lack of European identity in Britain. The British involvement in 
European politics has been marked by Euroscepticism, exceptionalism and, often, glorified 
isolationism (Geddes 2005, Cini and Solorzano-Borragan 2016). Almost alone in the EU, 
Britain recalls World War II (1939-1945) with more pride than fear and embarrassment. In 
his famous 1946 speech in Zurich, the then British prime minister Winston Churchill made 
the argument for a United States of Europe, which posited a Franco-German reconciliation as 
a starting point. However, he assigned Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of nations, 
as well as the USA and Soviet Russia, a slightly more marginal position as “friends and 
sponsors of the new Europe” (Wæver in der Dussen and Wilson (eds) 1995: 165). During the 
1940s and early 1950s the main debate was around issues of political integration. On the one 
hand, Britain, Ireland and the Scandinavian countries wanted more restricted, 
intergovernmental kind of cooperation, whereas most of the continental European countries 
were advocating for a deeper, supranational integration (Ibid: 166, 167). Britain joined the 
EU in 1973 during times of financial turmoil which has arguably put a strong economic 
rationale for joining. Consequently, this economic opportunism has become one of the main 
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justifications for Britain’s relationship with Europe.  
Secondly, being an “awkward partner” (George, 1998), unwilling to be a team player. 
Britain has advocated for wider, rather than deeper Europe, although it appears that the 
strategic widening had come at the cost of (some) deepening, which is often presented in 
public discourse as an existential threat, i.e. perceived loss of state sovereignty to Brussels. 
One of the key areas where sovereignty has been consistently narrated in political and public 
discourses as inherently fragile, is migration. This is particularly true for intra-EU migrations 
where the exercise of Treaty rights and the principle of free movement of people are de jure 
protected by EU courts, albeit de facto still managed by the British state and its state 
apparatus. Here the impact of media discourses has been substantial in merging the concept 
of Europe with the notion of uncontrollable immigration (Pencheva, 2016). The numerous 
legal opt-outs that Britain had secured as an EU member, especially within the field of home 
affairs and immigration, has meant that the country has had a considerable leverage in 
managing migration flows. This is in stark contrast with anecdotal evidence and media 
discourses suggesting that the EU does not simply challenge, but overturns the national 
approach to immigration (Geddes, 2005, Copsey and Haughton, 2014).  
 Thirdly, the political background of the referendum. In principle, referenda 
differ in nature from general elections in the sense that they are not “competitions amongst 
political parties to come into power but essentially consultations of the electorate on a 
divisive issue that goes beyond the lifespan of individual governments” (Dekavalla, 2016: 
793). In addition, the one-off nature of a referendum implies that a convergence between 
party identification/ideology and support for either of the options of the ballot, is not a 
necessary condition because a referendum is often issue-specific (Ibid, Haenggli and Kriesi, 
2010). The empirical case at hand, however, challenges such conventional wisdom because 
the win of the Leave vote emerged against the backdrop of all major political parties (with the 
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exception of UKIP) campaigning for Britain to remain a member of the EU. The UK 
referendum has been deeply embedded within domestic party politics and struggles for 
internal consolidation. On the one hand, the United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 
was  able to influence the mainstream political parties; the Conservative Party in particular 
(Cini and Solorzano-Borragan, 2016: 2). It was also the only party explicitly campaigning for 
an EU exit. On the other hand, the political campaigning of the Conservatives reflected David 
Cameron’s attempt to consolidate the party, and particularly the hardline Eurosceptic 
backbenchers within it, who have been increasingly rebellious since the 2010 general election 
(Ibid). Additionally, the deepening split within the Labour Party on questions of Europe, and 
since the mid-2000s, on intra-EU migration, is also worth mentioning.  
 Britain Stronger in Europe was led by businessman Stuart Rose and was supported by 
the main political party leaders, including David Cameron and George Osborne for the 
Conservatives and Jeremy Corbyn and Alan Johnson for Labour. It was also supported by 
Plaid Cymru in Wales, the Alliance Party and the Social Democratic and Labour Party 
(SDLP) in Northern Ireland, and the Green Party. The Scottish National Party (SNP) ran its 
own campaign in Scotland. Vote Leave constituted a much broader church with diverse 
agendas. It included senior Conservatives such as Michael Gove and Boris Johnson plus 
some Labour MPs, including Gisela Stuart and Graham Stringer, and the Democratic 
Unionist Party (DUP) in Northern Ireland. A number of groups were affiliated to it, such as 
Farmers for Britain, Muslims for Britain, and Out and Proud. UKIP and its leader, Nigel 
Farage, while campaigning to leave the EU, were not officially part of Vote Leave (Cini and 
Solorzano-Borragan, 2016).  
 Lastly, the key challenge for Remain and Leave was to produce a coherent and 
relatable message. This has been challenging because of the aforementioned traditional 
British Euroscepticism, but also because of its impact on voting. According to 
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Eurobarometer, over the long term (that is, 1973–2009), those who thought British 
membership of the EU to be a bad thing ranged from 12 to 48 per cent; those who thought it 
was a good thing ranged from 25 to 58 per cent; those who were neutral ranged from 18 to 37 
per cent; and the “don’t knows” amounted to between 6 and 24  per  cent. The key 
observation to note is that if the “don’t knows” and neutrals are added together they amount 
to between 24 and 61 per cent of voters (Copsey and Haughton, 2014: 77). Put simply, there 
is a substantial and potentially decisive volatility over perceptions of the EU.  
 Whilst there is a growing body of research which convincingly argues that intra-EU 
migration was the key factor behind the political decision to call a referendum and a main 
driving force for the Leave campaign, there is very little on why and how it links to 
sovereignty. After all, the Remain campaign was carefully avoiding the question of 
immigration throughout the campaign. We argue that the conceptual framing of sovereignty 
trumps the existing argument that the EU is traditionally blamed for domestic political 
failures (Cini and Solorzano-Borragan, 2016). This is not to suggest this argument is wrong, 
but rather that it is too state-actor centric and neglects the quality relationship between those 
who govern and those who are governed.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
II.    Empirical Material and Method 
     The empirical material of the article derives from the political communicative practices of 
the Remain and Leave campaigns including material from the affiliated yet unofficial 
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campaign Leave.EU. The article will focus on the political rhetoric of the campaigns in their 
attempt to persuade the UK electorate to vote either leave or remain. Thus, the empirical data 
that forms the backbone of the analysis is not a result of deliberate sampling, sensu stricto. 
All three websites and their contents are freely available online, which was considered a 
strength as it invites the attentive public to engage with the political campaigns on their own 
terms. Further, it is our proposition that the multiple competing interpretations of the issue of 
Britain’s EU membership will enhance, rather than diminish the validity of  the fetishization 
of sovereignty as a meta-frame. The three websites were accessed in the time period May - 
June 2017. 
The official leaflet produced by the then government, as well as the “breaking point” poster 
were also included as part of the empirical materials due to their salience in public discourses.  
 
2.1. Fetishizing sovereignty as a meta-frame  
Within the methodological framework of framing, the article will scrutinize the issue of 
Brexit and the effect such an issue has on political organization, sovereignty, racial and ethnic 
divisions. Framing as a strategic practice of communicating pertinent issues, which 
determines causes, morally evaluates, and offers remedies to perceived problems (Entman, 
1993). By fetishization of sovereignty we refer to the mutually constitutive process in which 
the Leave and Remain campaigns expressed an unequivocal commitment to sovereignty and 
in which the latter informed the logic behind both campaigns. Here, in a descriptive sense, 
fetishization is employed as a rhetorical label that designates sovereignty as a property that 
embodies a wide range of ideas and social relations between the sovereign subject and its 
Other and at the same time has the capacity to mediate these ideas and values through 
political communication. Thus, fetishization does not correspond to psychoanalytical or even 
religious understandings of the fetish as a substitute for anxieties and unattainable desires. 
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As the central argument is based on the conceptual reading of the three main websites 
associated with the Remain and Leave campaigns, the article seeks to advance the 
understanding of the fetishization of sovereignty as a meta-frame. This is because it captures 
an intersection between theoretical concepts and empirical data, thus cutting across multiple 
issues related to the UK’s EU membership: economic opportunities, the possibility to travel 
and study in other member states, but also issues of precarious employment practices, 
underperforming public services, concerns about border control and terrorism. Understanding 
the fetishization of sovereignty as a meta-frame highlights the common logic that informs 
both campaigns, as well as differences in terms of how facts were communicated. This is 
based on the premise that facts do not speak for themselves but are rather embedded within 
this meta-frame, which organises them and gives them salience depending on the political 
objectives they are expected to pursue (Gamson and Ryan 2005).  The fetishization of state 
sovereignty in the Remain and Leave campaigns redefines its subject, homo oeconomicus, by 
evoking its precarious existence and seeking political legitimacy on this basis. It also has 
important implications for the discursive construction of self and other as it signals the 
emergence of Xeno Homo Oeconomicus: the other to the British Homo Oeconomicus within 
the neoliberal paradigm. Our analysis will demonstrate that their relationship is a result from 
political and economic interdependencies and as such it could be construed in either 
antagonistic (Leave campaign) or benevolent (Remain campaign) terms.  
 
Thinking of the fetishization of sovereignty as a meta-frame represents a broad disciplinary 
consensus that framing serves a variety of disciplines and holds the possibility for useful 
cross-disciplinary approaches. Indeed, framing as an analytical tool is omnipresent across a 
variety of disciplines: sociology (Benford and Snow, 1986, Goffman, 1975, Gamson and 
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Modigliani, 1989), politics and public policy (Rose and Baumgartner, 2013, Balch and 
Balabanova 2014), media studies and communication (Gamson, 1992, Entman, 1993), 
international relations (Barnett 1999, Autesserre 2009) and animate distinct conversations in 
all of them. Framing has been employed as an analytical paradigm for various research 
agendas: from examining public opinion on nuclear energy, via social movements, political 
participation to cognitive linguistics. As an analytical tool it is not narrowly attached to a 
specific discipline, and has been used as a part of both inductive and deductive research 
designs, which has been considered an advantage for the purposes of this article. Its 
flexibility enables us to signpost the fetishization of sovereignty as both a theoretical 
contribution that captures the work of Foucault on neoliberalism and Sivanandan’s concept of 
xeno racism; and a practical tool for examining the complexities of the empirical materials.   
 
III.     On sovereignty and precarity  
The Brexit debate in conjunction with the immigration and financial crises in Europe have 
brought sovereignty to the foreground of political and public discourses. Its increased 
salience is indicative of its potency to politically mobilise populations, who are increasingly 
implicated in the ongoing redefinitions of sovereignty. In fact, our analysis goes further in 
demonstrating that via fetishising sovereignty in public discourses and political 
communication, sovereignty is no longer exclusively articulated as an essential attribute to 
the state, but it is also increasingly seen as an integral part of individual identities, 
particularly in terms of ethnicity and economic security. This is to suggest that even though 
sovereignty continues to be articulated as a political fact, it gains an additional, personal layer 
due to an emotive appeal to ‘control’ and ‘empowerment’ in both political campaigns.  
In this article we shift the focus from legislative and administrative issues to political 
communication and campaigning as a specific dimension of governmental practices. 
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Consequently, we argue that sovereignty has a specific use value and is not exclusively 
defined by (inter)national notions of virtue and specific legal frameworks. Political 
communication and in particular the Leave and Remain campaigns create a notion of 
sovereignty through precarisation and anxiety that is not law and policy binding but rather 
perceived as a useful tactic for mobilising voters. Indeed, contemporary understandings and 
applications of sovereignty blur the theoretical and empirical distinctions between the actions 
of the sovereign and of national governments. Following Judith Butler’s (1997; 2004) 
definition of “spectral sovereignty” as an instrument of power that allows the law to be used 
tactically for the subsequent categorization, monitoring, regulation and detention of the 
population sovereignty depends on the delegation of power to specific governmental bodies. 
Butler (ibid.) insists that political theory needs to abandon conceptions of centralised forms of 
power and instead should analyse the way power transforms itself according to different 
states of emergency.  
In the Brexit debate claims about sovereignty were frequent but rarely accompanied 
with any substantial explanation regarding legislative powers. Instead, the Leave campaign 
statements “taking control” and “taking back control” constituted the main communicative 
framework for the articulation of sovereignty. Sovereignty and by association control are 
communicated in the Leave and Remain campaigns within the socio-political context of 
threat and loss. In particular, property, prosperity, well-being, and national culture are 
consistently narrated as threatened by an interminable external threat namely the xeno homo 
oeconomicus. Both Leave and Remain campaigns amplified the relationship between state 
and citizen and consequently the statutory protection against external threats by 
acknowledging the precarious position of British homo oeconomicus in order to redefine 
sovereignty. Any idea of sovereignty implicitly or explicitly relies on a process of 
precarisation of citizens, which simultaneously reinforces the demand of strong (physical and 
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cultural) borders and exposes the vulnerability of the sovereign subject (Lorey, 2015). The 
anxieties experienced by the British homo oeconomicus and the demands for sovereignty and 
control as communicated by both campaigns do not necessarily challenge the process of 
precarisation initiated and propagated by neoliberalism but insist on a racial and ethnic order 
in which the sovereign subject is prioritised. It is in this order where British homo 
oeconomicus demands sovereignty and fights for its survival.   
By embedding the specific articulations of sovereignty within a broader theoretical 
discussion of sovereignty and precarity, we seek to argue that specific empirical articulations 
of sovereignty are representative of a new type of governmentality via fiscal austerity. 
Integrated financial systems, global institutions, global migratory flows, and the EU as an 
aspiring intranational polity are at odds with the state’s ability to define and govern its own 
territory. The emphasis on control, risk, danger and uncertainty and most importantly on the 
“breaking point” caused by the EU’s flawed immigration and refugee policy, problematizes 
the notion of sovereignty and at the same time forces us to rethink its contemporary meaning 
and applications.  
This is particularly challenging when recognizing the complex political and economic 
realities of interdependencies under the global reign of neoliberalism, where the practical 
differentiation between ‘friend’ and ‘enemy’, in principle so instrumental in making sense of 
international politics, becomes empirically blurred and loses its analytical merits. However, 
the need to draw borders remains, as it can be presumed that borders are essential for the 
definition and practice of sovereignty (Wallerstein, 2004). With the intensification of cultural 
borders and the attempts to racially and ethnically demarcate the differences and 
incompatibilities between the British homo oeconomicus and the xeno homo oeconomicus 
sovereignty itself becomes a means to govern the population.  
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IV.     Neo-liberalism and its subject Homo Oeconomicus  
Any discussion about neoliberalism as a system of political and economic 
organization needs to consider the ambiguous position the state finds itself in. Despite its 
dominance as a political and economic order neoliberalism is hard to define. As Jessop 
(2012) notes neoliberalism is much more used by critics of contemporary capitalist systems 
than by the very proponents of these systems. In fact, Jessop (ibid.) refers to the impossibility 
of talking about neoliberalism as a singular and coherent term and the need to acknowledge 
multiple forms and manifestations of neoliberalism. However, there exist two permanent 
features in neoliberalism in all its manifestations. First, neoliberalism aspires to expand the 
mechanisms of competitive markets to all aspects of social and political life. Second, 
neoliberalism has a problematic and occasionally hostile relationship with the state. If the 
state prohibits the expansion of the market and by association individual freedom then its 
powers need to either minimized or adjusted to new economic and political realities.   
However, the analysis of neoliberalism cannot and should not be limited to its 
destructive qualities regarding institutions, and ultimately the role of the state in national and 
global economies. Neoliberalism produces new social relations and structures in which new 
subjectivities emerge. The ways these subjectivities conduct themselves in competitive 
environments and at the same time are evaluated by rules and standards of competition reveal 
the social character of neoliberalism. Although neoliberalism is generally perceived as an 
economic system, Foucault (2008) perceives it as an all-encompassing political system. In 
particular, neoliberalism for Foucault (ibid.) is a political rationality that aspires to produce a 
permanent consensus amongst all those who operate within it such as industrialists, bankers, 
private and public sector employees, and law enforcement. This consensus requires and at the 
same time manifests itself with the existence of a collective subject capable of directing itself 
under changing political and economic conditions. This subject is predominantly defined by 
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the dominance of the market and historically has been named homo oeconomicus. From 
Adam Smith, Adam Ferguson, von Mises, to Friedrich Hayek, and Milton Freedman, homo 
oeconomicus has been the defining subject of both liberalism and neoliberalism. For Foucault 
(ibid.) there is a noticeable change in the understanding and actions of homo oeconomicus. In 
liberalism homo oeconomicus was understood as “the partner of exchange and the theory of 
utility based on a problematic of needs” (Foucault, 2008: 225). According to this conception, 
the market serves as a social space where participants offer what they have in exchange of 
what they need. In neoliberalism, the market as a place of exchange is transformed into a 
place of competition where the participants are not necessarily interested in exchange but 
instead in “investing” in themselves as both produces and consumers (Foucault, 2008: 226). 
Following the theoretical elaborations of Michel Wieviorka (2012; see also Alain Touraine, 
2000; 2010) we can argue that homo oeconomicus is an achievement and a constant struggle 
against institutions which seek to regulate the market and personal interest. The struggle for 
self interest and against regulatory forces characterize the Foucauldian homo oeconomicus. 
However, homo oeconomicus needs to be considered across the multiple manifestations of 
neoliberalism and the relationship the latter establishes with other social and political spheres.  
 Neoliberalism demands from its participants to trade off their social and civil rights 
for access and participation in the market. In addition to the transition from liberalism to 
neoliberalism identified by Foucault (2008), Brown (2015) highlights a new transition in the 
history of neoliberal subjectivity. Homo Oeconomicus is transformed from a subject attached 
to power to a subject existing in precarity: job insecurity and labour flexibility; national and 
private debt; fiscal consolidation and austerity. For Brown (ibid.) the contemporary homo 
oeconimicus does not perceive interest as its raison d’être but survival and sacrifice in a 
political and economic order, which disregards notions of well-being and of the collective 
good. Put differently, neoliberalism produces the subject it requires for the establishment of 
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competitive markets by the same means of governing the same subject. As a result, the 
subject must accept full responsibility if it fails to compete successfully in the neoliberal 
order. So far, the predominant view has been that the Other to homo oeconomicus is to be 
found in the periphery of the neoliberal order, a subject who lacks motivation, 
incentivization, and stimulation to make a success of her/his life through the structures 
imposed and reproduced by a dominant enterprise culture (Dardot and Laval, 2015). The new 
spirit of capitalism perfectly illustrated in managerial culture constructs the inflexible subject 
- the subject that is either unwilling or incapable to perform multiple tasks, to retrain, and 
embrace new methods of employment and assessment as an Other to the interest driven, 
flexible homo oeconomicus (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006). However, such accounts seldom 
refer to race and ethnicity as vital components for the constitution of an Other to 
neoliberalism. 
In order to understand homo oeconomicus through the prism of race and ethnicity, we 
are employing xeno racism as an auxiliary theoretical lens. Our justification is as much 
theoretical as it is empirical. On the one hand, there is an epistemological compatibility 
between a Foucauldian interpretation of neoliberalism and Sivanandan’s (2001) notion of 
xeno racism as a way of understanding the multifaceted exclusion which accompanies the 
global expansion of neoliberalism. Its main premise is that racism is “conditioned by 
economic imperatives, but negotiated through cultural agency” with the key mediating role of 
various types of media. Combined with the political economy of Homo oeconomicus 
(Foucault), it provide us with a fruitful analytical framework to critically assess the 
encompassing anti-foreigners Leave campaign. Sivanandan argues that in the endless pursuit 
of profits, today’s capitalism seeks to maintain the physical and discursive displacement of all 
those it deemed “others” on the grounds that they are scroungers, social raiders always eager 
to prey on the wealth of the West, to harm its identity and standard of living (Ibid: 2). In 
15 
order to achieve this goal, xeno-racism denies its colour-coding, i.e. it can be “meted out to 
impoverished strangers even if they are white” (Ibid: 2). Xeno-racism is a feature of the 
Manichaean world of global capitalism, where there are only the rich and the poor - and 
poverty is the new Black (Ibid: 2). On the other hand, as it will be empirically demonstrated 
by the analysis section below, the Leave campaign focused not only on the threat of asylum 
seekers and other groups of non-European migrants, but also put strong emphasis on the 
assorted dangers posed by phenotypically white EU migrants. 
 
 
V.  Communicating precarious subjectivities  
As it was already established, the fetishization of sovereignty informed the logic behind both 
campaigns, which was in turn communicated to the voters and the attentive public in different 
ways, according to the driving political ideologies of the key political parties. As Goodwin 
and Milazzo (2017) have noted, the public vote for Brexit was not simply driven by sheer 
hostility towards immigration, but also sought to convene a general desire to regain control 
over this salient issue in British politics. Therefore, the overarching political logic is that the 
desire to regain control is a function of its perception as lost.  
 The specific framing of the nexus between sovereignty and immigration creates a 
complex relationship between self and other. However, the other to the homo oeconomicus is 
not to be found outside the neoliberal paradigm, but rather within it; this other we call Xeno 
homo oeconomicus. The self and other homo oeconomicus are split across ethnic lines and 
narrated as constantly competing with each other over scarce employment and welfare 
resources. The framing of both campaigns textually validates the precarious status of the 
subject and suggests that the British homo oeconomicus Self should be anxious about the 
Xeno homo oeconomicus Other not because of the differences between them, but because of 
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their sameness. For they both represent the anxious, individualist survival that stems from the 
broken relationship between the state and its people. They are both creators and creations of 
neoliberalism.  
 The Leave campaign brought to the foreground the issue of race and ethnicity as a 
vital component for the understanding and subsequent establishment of a prosperous and 
cohesive society. However, there existed a strong political background with respect to the 
importance of these components in public debate. A Conservative general election campaign 
poster from 2005 saying “it’s not racist to impose limits on immigration” attempted on one 
hand to communicate the urgency of controlling immigration and on the other hand to 
rearrange the terms of public debate and attitudes on immigration. The poster made clear that 
national citizens should not feel restrained by accusations of racism when demanding control 
and homogeneity. Discussing her immigration policy in an interview with The Telegraph in 
2012 the Home Secretary Theresa May explained that her aim is to “create here in Britain a 
really hostile environment for illegal immigration.” The conception of this environment 
became a reality in July 2013 when the Home Office deployed vans in six London boroughs 
asking “In the UK illegally”, if so “GO HOME OR FACE ARREST”. The Home Office also 
made sure to communicate the efficiency of its campaign by indicating to Londoners the 
number of arrests on a weekly basis in their area.  
     These political campaigns and their accompanying rhetoric constitute the political and 
communicative predecessor of Vote Leave’s focus on immigration. Two key elements of the 
Leave campaign highlight its relationship with immigrants as constant figures of suspicion 
and with xenophobic rhetoric. First, the anti-immigration rhetoric was and still is focused on 
poor and volatile countries and second, the association of the religion of Islam with growing 
anti-refugee sentiments.  
     The slogan “take back control on immigration” was crucial for the public appeal of the 
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Leave campaign. This involved the creation of a moral panic over the number of immigrants 
living in and coming to the UK. Boris Johnson claimed that since 2004 1.25 million people 
have been added to the overall population due to immigration from EU countries. “That is 
bigger than the city of Birmingham”. Furthermore, Michael Gove suggested that Turkey’s 
potential accession to the EU would put Britain at higher risk of crime. Overall, the Leave 
campaign (Vote Leave; Leave.EU; Grassroots Out) has been dominated or even led by 
political figures who gained their political voice as soon as citizens from Poland, Bulgaria, 
Romania, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Latvia, Lithuania and Slovenia joined the EU. Vote 
Leave perceived Britain’s membership to the EU and the subsequent arrival of EU citizens as 
a biopolitical threat. On a different yet similar note, the alleged threat that immigration poses 
to security and public life was captured by one of Leave. EU’s most controversial political 
posters during the course of the Brexit debate. The poster used a photograph of asylum 
seekers from the Middle East crossing the Croatia-Slovenia border in 2015. The slogan 
emblazoned with big red fonts across the poster reads: “Breaking Point” and with smaller 
white fonts “The EU has failed us all. We must break free of the EU and take back control of 
our borders”. The poster made explicit references to a Nazi propaganda video depicting a 
similar flow of Jewish refugees with the following description: “who flooded Europe’s cities 
after the last war  - parasites, undermining their host countries”. Challenged about the 
message of the poster and its resemblance to Nazi propaganda the leader of the UK 
Independence Party (UKIP) and Leave. EU campaign replied:  
 
“this is a photograph  - an accurate undoctored photograph taken in October last 
year following Angela Merkel’s call in the summer and frankly, if you believe, as 
I have always believed, that we should open our hearts to genuine refugees, that is 
one thing. But, frankly, as you can see from this picture most of the people 
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coming are young males and, yes they may be coming from countries that are not 
in a very happy state, they may be coming from places poorer than us, but the EU 
has made a fundamental error that risks the security of everybody”.  
 
     Control was the central demand and focal point of Vote Leave. The campaign emphasised 
the need to control the country’s borders and immigration flows and such a need was a 
presented as a response to the volatility of global politics: “in a world with so many threats 
it’s safer to control our own borders and decide ourselves who can come into this country, 
not overruled by EU judges”. According to the Vote Leave campaign the EU is at once the 
cause and the symptom of insecurity and volatility. Special references were made to EU’s 
ambitions to expand and incorporate states with either significant problems or polities and 
constitutions incompatible with the UK’s: “the EU is expanding: Turkey with a population of 
76 million is one FIVE new countries joining the EU. The other countries according to Vote 
Leave are Albania (2.8 million); Macedonia (2.1) million; Montenegro (0.6 million); and 
Serbia (7.2 million). Vote Leave claimed that the possible accession of these countries to the 
EU will further contribute to uncontrollable flows of immigration”; “immigration will 
continue to be out of control. Nearly 2 million people came to the UK from the EU over the 
last ten years. Imagine what it will be like in future decades when new poorer countries join”. 
The Leave campaign attempted to dominate the space of popular and national imagination by 
projecting a dystopia of poor public services and of a torn social fabric. A Vote Leave TV 
broadcast about the NHS depicted two parallel scenarios: In the first scenario, where Britain 
remains a member of the EU, an elderly female patient is made to wait because of the 
uncontrolled flow of immigrants who are treated ahead of her. In the second scenario, where 
Britain has already left the EU, the reception room looks almost empty and the elderly 
woman is treated fast and effectively by smiling and attentive staff. The alleged cultural and 
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political expansion of the religion of Islam due to mass immigration and inconsiderate liberal 
European political leaders was another strong theme in the Leave campaign. Leave. EU 
produced a “deliberately provocative” (Banks, 2016) social media poster criticizing 
Germany’s Willkommenskultur to Syrian refugees by depicting an Islamic takeover of 
Germany. The poster shows a TV half sunk into a snow hill and with white bold, capital 
letters reads: “Germany’s Christmas Message to be Subtitled”. The subtitle in bright yellow 
letters is in Arabic.  
     Contrasting this, Stronger In attempted to make a case about the economic benefits of the 
UK’s access to the single market and the customs union as well of free mobility of labour, 
services and ideas. In order to counteract visions of an Imperial Britain freed from the 
ideological and bureaucratic constraints of the EU, propagated by the Leave campaign, 
Stronger In emphasised the risks of leaving. The campaign referred to research by the Bank 
of England for communicating as effectively as possible the “economic shock”, “putting our 
jobs at risk”, and “family budget under pressure” in a post EU political and economic 
arrangement. Continuity and stability were presented as quintessential ingredients for the 
country’s prosperity. Stronger In referred to prospect of endless negotiations for new trade 
deals and access to new research, security, farming and infrastructure programmes. The 
Conservative Government aligned itself with the Stronger In campaign and produced a leaflet 
(HM Government, 2016) that was sent by post to all UK addresses. In the first instance, the 
leaflet did not challenge the anti-immigration stance and xenophobic assertions of the Leave 
campaign but instead focused on the economic and security risks the UK will be facing in the 
advent of Brexit. Uncertainty is mentioned three times and risk twice in the leaflet. On a 
similar tone with the campaign literature of Stronger In, the Government’s leaflet made 
references to the UK’s strong trading relationship with the EU by arguing that “EU countries 
buy 44% of everything we sell abroad, from cars to insurance”; “the single market makes it 
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easier and cheaper for UK companies to sell their products outside the UK, creating jobs as a 
result”; being inside the EU also makes it more attractive for companies to invest in the UK 
meaning more jobs”. The British government presented foreign leaders such as Barack 
Obama, Hillary Clinton, and Emmanuel Macron, and international institutions such as the 
OECD, the World Bank, and the IMF as its natural political allies concerning the 
communication of the long-term problems Brexit will cause to the British economy. In 
particular, the former US President Barack Obama emphasised the possible demotion of the 
UK in the global economic and political order by saying that “Britain would be at the back of 
the queue” during negotiations for new trade deals, and the current French president 
Emmanuel Macron warned that the UK would be “killed” economically if it chose to leave.    
     However, in order to reconcile anxieties about immigration with membership to the EU, 
the government made references to the special relationship the UK has developed with the 
EU regarding border security and safety. In opposition to the Leave campaign, the leaflet 
stresses the UK’s independence from the Treaty of Schengen and its ability to control 
national borders: “we control our borders which gives us the right to check everyone, 
including EU nationals, arriving from continental Europe”. The issue of entitlement and 
access to welfare is also raised in the leaflet. Once more, the government indicates its 
political and administrative distance from EU policy by arguing that under new rules the UK 
will be a less attractive destination for EU citizens: 
 
“The Government has negotiated a deal that will make our benefits system less of 
a draw for EU citizens. In future, new EU migrants will not have full access to 
certain benefits until they have worked here for up to four years. The Government 
will have greater powers to take action where there is abuse of our immigration 
system” (HM Government, 2016).  
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The Government and Stronger In wished to distanced themselves from the political 
conviction that the free market is inseparable from the free mobility of people. Indeed, the 
Remain campaign succumbed to the widespread notion that immigrants are a burden on the 
welfare state and a destabilising force concerning social and cultural cohesion.  
 
 
 
 
 
VI. By way of concluding: is it racist to be anxious?  
 
In this paper we have put forward a twofold argument: i) that British national sovereignty has 
been fetishized in both Remain and Leave campaigns, and that ii) this has important 
implications for the discursive construction of self and other within the neoliberal paradigm. 
By employing a Foucauldian understanding of neoliberalism, as well as Sivanandan’s (2001) 
notion of xeno-racism, we have argued that the fetishization of sovereignty functions as a 
distinct meta-frame, which is informed by a specific understanding of sovereignty and which 
delineates two political subjectivities within the neoliberal paradigm: the British homo 
oeconomicus and the Xeno homo oeconomicus.  In other words, our analysis entails the 
transition from abstract theoretical models such as neoliberalism and its subject homo 
oeconomicus to increasingly complex, yet concrete political issues, such as the contemporary 
articulation of sovereignty by the Leave and Remain campaigns. Our conceptual-driven 
approach to such a pertinent political issue allowed us to conduct a critical, in-depth analysis 
which contributes to a more profound understanding of the complex nexus between 
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sovereignty and precarity.  
 
Firstly, both Remain and Leave campaigns demonstrably fetishized sovereignty, which is 
indicative of the global dominance of neoliberalism as an economic paradigm, as well as a 
tool for political governance. In the Remain case, the emphasis was put on the political and 
economic realities of increased interconnectedness and the assorted interdependencies and 
vulnerabilities that are generated as a result. In this regard, the main message of the Remain 
camp was incoherent and served mainly as an implicit, powerless recognition of the 
multifaceted vulnerabilities and anxieties, experienced by the voters. The Leave campaign 
produced a more coherent, relatable message with a strong emotive appeal. On the one hand 
it was recognizing and normalizing the political, economic, and cultural anxieties and 
vulnerabilities that most people experience on the daily basis.  On the other hand, it morally 
validated them and empowered the voters by its motto Take back control. The emotive appeal 
to anxiety normalized xenophobia in public discourses and demanded political legitimacy on 
that basis.  
Secondly, it is of crucial importance to emphasize that whilst neither of the political 
campaigns substantially challenged the reign of the neoliberal order, the Leave campaign was 
the one to mobilize various precarious subjectivities and to articulate the British self, whose 
hospitality has been unjustly abused, and the xeno other, who is always ready to attack the 
vulnerable unsuspecting British self, raiding and damaging all that is valuable to the latter. 
Therefore we have argued that self and other are both to be found within the neoliberal 
paradigm and that this dichotomy is a product of the mobilization of ethnic and racial bias. 
The importance and prominence of this aspect in the Leave campaign is exemplified by its 
absence in the Remain campaign. Both Leave and Remain campaigns highlighted insecurity 
and inequality without challenging neoliberalism and more specifically austerity politics, 
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insecure employment and privatization of public assets. In fact, the solutions to the problems 
identified in the Brexit debate can only be found within the renewed rationality of 
neoliberalism. Reforms for a competitive state through border security, strict immigration 
policies and limited access to welfare appear as a desperate attempt to constitute an idea of 
sovereignty around precarity and xenophobia.  
 
Lastly, the political communication data we used lends support to the conventional wisdom 
that right of exclusion is usually considered an attribute of sovereignty and territoriality and is 
defended as an inherent power necessary for the self-preservation of the state. In other words, 
if a sovereign “could not exclude aliens it would be to that extent subject to the control of 
another power” (Nafziger, 1983: 804). In this regard, the narrative reflects anti-immigration 
sentiments as much as a significant yet fragile relationship between self-identity and 
sovereignty (Ibid.). Thus, political communication dictates that it is in the British Homo 
Oeconomicus’ best interest to fight for the preservation of sovereignty, for without it the 
British self would perish.  
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